Volume 107
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 107,
2002-2003
6-1-2002

A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class
Actions Under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law
Seth William Goren

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Seth W. Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class Actions Under
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 107 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2002).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol107/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

I

Articles

I

A Pothole on the Road to Recovery:
Reliance and Private Class Actions Under
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law
Seth William Goren*
I.

Introduction

Imagine this: as an attorney with clients all over the country, you
spend a great deal of time on airplanes flying back and forth across the
United States. To alleviate your frequent bouts of motion sickness, you
take Dizz-Away, an over-the-counter medication that claims to relieve
symptoms of motion sickness and has no other beneficial effects. One
day, you discover that a federal agency has determined that Dizz-Away
is nothing more than a sugar pill. As the news frenzy intensifies, you
* Associate, Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Philadelphia, PA. B.A., 1994; M.A., 1994;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1998. Member, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and District
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colleagues and family, especially the Honorable John W. Herron, the Honorable Albert
W. Sheppard, Jr., Nancy Eshelman, Peter Kaldes, Julie Master, Fadia Elia, Sara Lee

Goren, Joshua D. Rosenberg and David Zeeman. In memory and in honor of both
Reuben Rosenbergs.
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hear that there are millions of consumers like you who purchased DizzAway to fight motion sickness and ended up with a product that provided
no benefits whatsoever. The more you learn, the more deceived and
frustrated you feel and the more you want Dizz-Away's manufacturer
punished for its conduct. Of course, you realize that an individual claim
is impractical because of the relatively small amount you would recover
and the onerous demands of a lawsuit, leaving the possibility of
collective action on behalf of all Dizz-Away purchasers as the most
logical response.
One might think that a consumer in your situation would be entitled
to relief under your state's consumer protection law and that the courts of
your state would be open to entertaining your claim. In most states, you
would be correct. In Pennsylvania, however, your ability to secure
compensation and even to initiate suit would be far from certain. Since
Pennsylvania enacted its Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law ("UTPCPL")1 in 1968,2 the courts of the Commonwealth
have battled over what elements are required to sustain a successful
claim under the UTPCPL. At the heart of the UTPCPL conflict is the
question of whether a UTPCPL claim requires proof of each element of
common law fraud. This question not only can create uncertainty for a
single plaintiff, but also can wreak havoc on private class action
plaintiffs seeking redress on behalf of themselves and the class that they
wish to represent. Indeed, imposing the requirement that UTPCPL class
action plaintiffs prove each element of fraud, including individual
reasonable reliance, is likely to thwart most plaintiffs' class efforts at the
certification stage and frustrate most efforts to remedy damages incurred
by consumers.
Each side has seen its victories in this debate, as Pennsylvania
courts have gone back and forth between construing the UTPCPL to the
benefit of injured consumers and imposing a burden on consumers
3
similar to that required for pre-UTPCPL common law fraud actions.
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stepped into the fray in
Weinberg v. Sun Co. 4 and attempted to clarify the requirements for a
private claim under the UTPCPL.5 Although this decision resolved the
specific matter on appeal, it leaves a number of questions unanswered
due to both the limited issue before the court and the fact that the
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to 9.3 (West 2001).
2.

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, P.L. 1224, 1968 Pa. Laws

387.
3. See generally infra Part IV.
4. 777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001).
5. Kathleen Dolegowski, Private Plaintiffs' False Advertising Claim Must Show
Individual Reliance, Causation,LAW. J., Sept. 21, 2001, at 3.

2002]

A POTHOLE ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY

Weinberg court did not address the effect of the 1996 amendment to the
UTPCPL ("1996 Amendment"). 6 Depending on the resolution of these
questions, Pennsylvania could deprive consumers of the most potent
weapon in their arsenal for combating unscrupulous sales practices and
thereby find itself dangerously out of step with the rest of the country in
its treatment of consumer claims.
Although any legal ambiguity has the potential to be troublesome,
we now live in a world where a transaction giving rise to a UTPCPL
claim could come in one of any number of different media, and a
violation of the UTPCPL could be no more than a click away. In such an
environment, the absence of certainty ts to what the UTPCPL does and
does not require for a valid claim has the potential to disrupt commerce
and to flood the courts with claimants unsure if their claims have merit
and defendants unsure if their conduct was proper.
This article attempts to address some of the gaps left by Weinberg in
two primary ways. First, it discusses the history of the UTPCPL and its
relation to common law fraud and reliance, as well as Weinberg and its
implications for UTPCPL class actions. This is accomplished through
Part II's review of the UTPCPL's origins, Part III's discussion of
Pennsylvania UTPCPL decisions and Part IV's detailed analysis of
Weinberg itself. Second, Part V proposes ways in which the UTPCPL
can be interpreted to provide consumers with the protection that was
intended.
II.

Origins and Statutory Development of the UTPCPL

A.

The Federal Trade Commission Act, the FederalLanham
Trademark Act and Common Law

The UTPCPL has its origins in two federal acts: the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTCA"), enacted in 1914, 7 and the Federal Lanham
Trademark Act ("Lanham Act"), enacted in 1946. 8 Both of these acts
were designed, in part, to combat consumer fraud and to protect the
public from unfair trade practices, 9 but both met with limited success. 10
6.

Act of Dec. 4, 1996, P.L. 906, 1996 Pa. Laws 146.

7.

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2001).

8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2001).
9. Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor C.N.C. Sys. Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1439
(9th Cir. 1993); Mech. Plastics Corp. v. Titan Techs., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1143
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985)), aff'd, 33 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1994); Pirozzi v. Penske Olds-Cadillac-GMC, Inc.,
605 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
10. William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation,46 TuL. L. REv.
724, 729 n. 10 (1972) (discussing limitations on Federal Trade Commission enforcement
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The rights of individual consumers under traditional common law actions
remained limited:
It was originally believed that a freely competitive economy was
sufficient to protect buyers from fraudulent practices. A dominant
theme in commercial law was caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware."
The consumer was assumed to be able to strike a fair bargain with
any seller, and the customer was individually responsible to remedy
any deficiencies. Defrauded customers were left with a common-law
action for fraud against the seller as their primary recourse. The
protection afforded consumers by common-law remedies was
generally ineffective. The burdens of a common-law action were
sufficient to dissuade all but the most persistent and most seriously
injured customer. The difficulties in proving these elements were
summarized by one commentator:
The purchaser willing to seek recovery of the nominal sum
usually involved was likely to be told by the court that scienter had
not been adequately proved, that his reliance on the misrepresentation
was unreasonable because he should have examined the goods or
obtained the counsel of impartial and reliable persons, that the
representations concerned matters of opinion and thus - as
"puffing" - should have been treated with skepticism, or that in any
case he had not sufficiently demonstrated that his purchase was
induced by the advertisement.11

B.

The UTPCPL

Faced with these constraints, in the 1960s, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") began urging states to adopt their own versions of
the FTCA, called "Little FTC Acts," to complement the federal
versions,' 2 with a goal of having federal authorities provide substantive
guidelines and state officials provide enforcement and remedies. 3 To
of consumer protection laws, including modest staffing and geographic distance between
communities in which improper conduct takes place and Federal Trade Commission
offices).
11. State ex rel. Miller v. Hydro Mag, Ltd., 436 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 1989)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Lovett, supra note 10, at 726-31
(discussing the legal background of the FTCA and modem consumer protection law);
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1016, 1016-17

(1967) (discussing consumer remedies before the institution of the FTCA).
12. Charlotte E. Thomas, The Quicksand of Private Actions Under the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade PracticesAct: Strict Liability, Treble Damages, and Six Years To Sue, 102
DICK. L. REV. 1,2 (1997).
13. Janice R. Franke & Deborah A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer
Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.

347, 357 (1992).
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this end, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL"), working in concert with the FTC, 14 drafted an
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ("Consumer
Protection Act") in 1967.15 In 1968, Pennsylvania enacted the UTPCPL
as an act "[p]rohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair or
16
It
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.'
17
recommendations.
NCCUSL's
on
act
to
states
was one of the first
1.

Statutory Provisions

While the entire UTPCPL functions as an integrated statute, there
are four specific sections that are of particular interest for the purpose of
consumer class actions: section 3, section 2(4), section 4, and section 9.18
The first two are sections 3 and 2(4). Section 3 deems "unfair methods
of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to be
methods of competition" and
unlawful. 19 Section 2(4) defines "unfair
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices., 20

14. Anthony Paul Dunbar, Consumer Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of
State Deceptive Trade PracticesLegislation, 59 TUL. L. REv. 427, 427 (1984).
15.

COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION FOR 1967, at A-71

(1966). Several other proposals for consumer protection statutes were introduced at this
time as well, including the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts in 1964, 7A U.L.A.
206 (2000), and 1966, 7A U.L.A. 273 (2000), and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act in 1970, 7A U.L.A. 318 (2000).
16. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, P.L. 1224, 1968 Pa. Laws
387.
17.

COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION FOR 1970, at 142

(1969) [hereinafter SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1970]. In 1970, the Council of State
Governments published a revised draft of the Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 141. The
updated draft had three different versions of the definition ascribed to the unlawful acts
prohibited by the statute from which adopted states were able to select. Id. at 146-47.
The revised Consumer Protection Act differed from the 1967 Act in that it added what is
described as the "Catchall Provision," which Pennsylvania had already adopted, as well
as a provision allowing private and class actions. Id. at 141, 147.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-2(4), -3, -4, -9 (West 2001).
19. Id. § 201-3.
20. "Unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" are
defined as any one or more of the following:
(i) Passing off goods or services as those of another;
(ii) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(iii) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection or association with, or certification by, another;
(iv) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in
connection with goods or services;
(v) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,'
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or
that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection that
he does not have;
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(vi) Representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered,
reconditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand;
(vii) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(viii) Disparaging the goods, services or business of another by false or
misleading representation of fact;
(ix) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(x) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of
quantity;
(xi) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for,
existence of, or amounts of price reductions;
(xii) Promising or offering prior to time of sale to pay, credit or allow to any
buyer, any compensation or reward for the procurement of a contract for
purchase of goods or services with another or others, or for the referral of the
name or names of another or others for the purpose of attempting to procure or
procuring such a contract of purchase with such other person or persons when
such payment, credit, compensation or reward is contingent upon the
occurrence of an event subsequent to the time of the signing of a contract to
purchase;
(xiii) Promoting or engaging in any plan by which goods or services are sold to
a person for a consideration and upon the further consideration that the
purchaser secure or attempt to secure one or more persons likewise to join the
said plan;.., promoting or engaging in any plan, commonly known as or
similar to the so-called "Chain-Letter Plan" or "Pyramid Club."... ;
(xiv) Failing to comply with the terms of any written guarantee or warranty
given to the buyer at, prior to or after a contract for the purchase of goods or
services is made;
(xv) Knowingly misrepresenting that services, replacements or repairs are
needed if they are not needed;
(xvi) Making repairs, improvements or replacements on tangible, real or
personal property, of a nature or quality inferior to or below the standard of that
agreed to in writing;
(xvii) Making solicitations for sales of goods or services over the telephone
without first clearly, affirmatively and expressly stating:
(A) the identity of the seller;
(B) that the purpose of the call is to sell goods or services;
(C) the nature of the goods or services; and
(D) that no purchase or payment is necessary to be able to win a prize or
participate in a prize promotion if a prize promotion is offered.... ;
(xviii) Using a contract, form or any other document related to a consumer
transaction which contains a confessed judgment clause that waives the
consumer's right to assert a legal defense to an action;
(xix) Soliciting any order for the sale of goods to be ordered by the buyer
through the mails or by telephone unless, at the time of the solicitation, the
seller has a reasonable basis to expect that it will be able to ship any ordered
merchandise to the buyer:
(A) within that time clearly and conspicuously stated in any such solicitation;
or
(B) if no time is clearly and conspicuously stated, within thirty days after
receipt of a properly completed order from the buyer, provided, however,
where, at the time the merchandise is ordered, the buyer applies to the seller for
credit to pay for the merchandise in whole or in part, the seller shall have fifty
days, rather than thirty days, to perform the actions required by this subclause;
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It is through the synergy of section 3's prohibition and section
2(4)'s definitions that the UTPCPL prohibits specific and diverse acts
that have been characterized as common law tradename infringement,
misappropriation, disparagement, false advertising, fraud, breach of
contract and breach of warranty. 21 In addition, violations of several other
Pennsylvania and federal statutes may also be treated as per se violations
of the UTPCPL.2 2
Section 2(4) also includes what is commonly referred to as the
"Catchall Provision." Now found in paragraph 2(4)(xxi),23 the Catchall
Provision prohibits "engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of

(xx) Failing to inform the purchaser of a new motor vehicle offered for sale at
retail by a motor vehicle dealer of the following:
(A) that any rustproofing of the new motor vehicle offered by the motor vehicle
dealer is optional;
(B) that the new motor vehicle has been rustproofed by the manufacturer and
the nature and extent, if any, of the manufacturer's warranty which is
applicable to that rustproofing ....
Id. §§ 201-2(4)(i) to -2(4)(xx). The first twelve paragraphs of section 2(4) were a part of
the UTPCPL as it was originally enacted in 1968. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law § 2. Paragraphs (xiii) through (xvi) were added in 1976. Act of Nov. 24,
1976, P.L. 1166, § 1, 1976 Pa. Laws 260. Paragraphs (xvii) through (xx) were added in
1996. Act of Dec. 4, 1996, P.L. 906, § 1, 1996 Pa. Laws 146.
21. In Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), the court described
paragraph (i) as passing-off claims, paragraphs (ii) and (iii) as misappropriation,
paragraph (iv) as tradename infringement, paragraphs (v), (ix), (x), and (xi) as various
forms of false advertising, paragraphs (vi) and (vii) as fraud, paragraph (xvi) as breach of
contract, and paragraph (xiv) as breach of warranty. Id.at 494 nn.10-17.
22. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2524(c) (2001) (providing penalties for
unauthorized practice of law); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2905 (2001) (regulating 900-number
abuses); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7137 (2001) (state odometer tampering law); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 455.609(g) (West 2001) (allowing cancellation of time-share and
membership campground contracts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1961 (West 2001)
(Automobile Lemon Law); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1970.8 (West 2001) (Motor Vehicle
Damage Disclosure Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2175 (West 2001) (Health Club Act);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2190 (West 2001) (Credit Services Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§ 2207(West 2001) (Plain Language Consumer Contract Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
2247 (West 2001) (Telemarketer Registration Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2270.5(a)
(West 2001) (Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act); Bolden v. Potamkin-Auerbach
Chevrolet, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 618, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act); In re Stewart, 93 B.R. 878, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Goods and Service
Installment Sales Act); Pekular v. Eich, 513 A.2d 427, 433-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(Unfair Insurance Practices Act); Culbreth v. Lawrence J. Miller, Inc., 477 A.2d 491, 500
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (Public Adjuster Law); Pa. Bankers Ass'n. v. Commonwealth, 427
A.2d 730, 732-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Safeguard Inv. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 404
A.2d 720, 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (Usury statute).
23. When the UTPCPL was first enacted, the Catchall Provision was found in
paragraph 2(4)(xiii). Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law § 2. After
additional specific conduct was added to section 2(4) in 1976 and 1996, the Catchall
Provision was moved to the paragraph in which it is found today. tit. 73, § 201-2.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:1

misunderstanding." 24 One of the most significant advantages of the
Catchall Provision is its flexibility:
The Legislature realized, as has often been stated, that no sooner
is one fraud specifically defined and outlawed than another variant of
it appears. Rather than restricting courts and the enforcing authorities
solely to narrowly specified types of unfair and deceptive practices,
the Legislature wisely declared unlawful "any other fraudulent
conduct." This is a common and well-accepted legislative res onse
to the mischief caused by unfair and deceptive market practices.
This flexibility has averted the possibility that "the broad prohibition of
section 3 [could] be 'eluded 26by new schemes which the fertility of man's
invention would contrive.'
When the UTPCPL was first enacted, the only mode of enforcement
available was through section 4.27 Under this section, the Pennsylvania
attorney general or a district attorney who believed that a person was
using or was about to use a method listed in section 2(4) could bring an
action "to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction" the method's
use. 28 This action
was conditioned on such proceedings being "in the
29
public interest.,

Although the UTPCPL as a whole, and section 4 in particular, was a
step forward for consumer protection, the provision restricting
enforcement to only the attorney general or a district attorney was
problematic. Early court decisions limited the injunctive power afforded
by the statute, 30 and the government functionaries empowered to enforce
the statute found themselves occupied with more serious offenses than
UTPCPL violations.3' Moreover, it was determined that Pennsylvania
24. The Catchall Provision originally barred "engaging in any other fraudulent
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act § 2. In 1996, the phrase "or deceptive" was
inserted after "fraudulent," Act of Dec. 4, 1996, § 1,with unclear consequences. See
infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
25. Creamer ex rel Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 82627 (Pa. 1974).
26. Id.at 827 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 n.
41 (1963)).
27. tit. 73, § 201-4. Pennsylvania adopted the UTPCPL between the drafting of the
1967 original Consumer Protection Act and the 1970 publication of the revised Consumer
Protection Act, which included a private right of action. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION
1970, supra note 17, at 144.
28. tit. 73, § 201-4.
29. Id.
30. In Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Indus., Inc., 4 Pa. Commw. 1 (1971), for
example, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the UTPCPL gave no power to enjoin
the sale of hearing aid devices that the defendants had sold using false advertisements.
Id.at 24.
31. 1 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 2153 (1975); see also Jeff Sovern, PrivateActions
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courts remedying violations of the UTPCPL32 could not order violators to

make restitution for their improper conduct.
Pennsylvania was not alone in experiencing these problems. These
enforcement difficulties mirrored problems that existed nationally, and
included a lack of public resources, information barriers, limited
jurisdiction and the inaccessibility of public officials. In addition,
political dependence hampered the ability of government entities to
address consumers' claims.33
Partly as a result of the perceived deficiencies of section 4,34 section
9.2 was added to the UTPCPL in 1976 to provide for a private cause of
action under the UTPCPL. a5 In its entirety, this section provides:
(a) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services
primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby
suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal,
as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act
or practice declared unlawful by section 3 of this act, may bring a
private action to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars
($100), whichever is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award
up to three times the actual damages sustained, but not less than one
hundred dollars ($100), and may provide such additional relief as it
deems necessary or proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in
addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable

under the Deceptive Trade PracticesActs: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 448 (1991) ("State and local consumer agencies lack sufficient
resources to pursue every consumer fraud vigorously .... ); Case Comment, The
Attorney General as Consumer Advocate: City of York v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1170, 1170 (1973) ("Special concern has arisen when
the consumer has his interests theoretically represented by governmental agencies but
those agencies seem less than energetic in fulfilling their duty of representation.").
32. See, e.g., Packel ex rel Commonwealth v. A.P.S.C.O., 309 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (holding that the UTPCPL "does not authorize restitution as a
remedy").
33. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the
U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 137-42 (1999) [hereinafter Issacharoff 1999]
(noting that limitations on government enforcement of consumer protection statutes
include lack of resources and limited jurisdiction); see also Arthur Best, Controlling
FalseAdvertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing and
Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1985) (discussing advantages of allowing

private actions under the FTCA); Steven W. Gard, Critique, Purpose and Promise
Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement Under the FTCA, 70 Nw. U. L.
REV. 274, 279 (1975).
34. 1 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 2153 (1975); see also Sovem, supra note 31, at

448 (stating that the purpose behind allowing private consumer protection actions is "[t]o
plug the holes in consumer fraud enforcement" left by the lack of resources at
government consumer agencies).
35. Act of Nov. 24, 1976, P.L. 1166, § 1, 1976 Pa. Laws 260. A right of private
action similarly was also inserted into the revised Consumer Protection Act published in
1970. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1970, supra note 17, at 147.
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attorney fees.
(b) Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court
made under section 4 of this act shall be prima facie evidence in an
action brought under section 9.2 of this act that the defendant used or
employed
acts or practices declared unlawful by section 3 of this
36
act.

This section places Pennsylvania in the solid majority of states that,
unlike the FTCA, 37 allow private individuals to bring suit under the
state's unfair trade practices and consumer protection law.38 In opening
up this private cause of action, section 9.2 is broader than section 4.
At the same time, section 9.2 is also narrower than section 4, as
section 4 requires that an action be "in the public interest," while a
private action is "limited to the purchase and sale of consumer goods or
services., 39 In addition, section 9.2 requires that the harm suffered by
the consumer be "as a result of' the conduct set forth in section 2(4). No
such requirement exists in section 4.
2.

Fraud, Reliance and Causation

In Pennsylvania, one of the enduring questions surrounding the
UTPCPL is whether all or only some of the prohibited conduct set forth
in section 2(4) is essentially a detailed codification of common law fraud
and thus requires proof of each element of fraud. The language in
section 9.2 requires only that a private action plaintiff suffer damages "as
a result of' the offending act, practice or method, mandating proof of
causation. 40 However, if a UTPCPL claim also requires proof of
common law fraud, a private action plaintiff also has the burden of
establishing justifiable reliance, an essential element of fraud in
Pennsylvania.4 1
36.
37.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (West 2001).
Kaiser v. Dialist Co., 603 F. Supp. 110, 111 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (collecting cases);

JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR & DECEPTIVE ACTS & PRACTICES §

5.1.3.1.10 (5th ed. 2001).
38. See Sovem, supra note 31, at 448 ("[N]early every state has now extended to
injured consumers the power to sue merchants who engage in deceptive practices.");
SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, § 8.2 (noting that "[tihere is a private UDAP remedy
in every state except Iowa").
39. Thomas, supra note 12, at 4.
40. See, e.g., Lambert v. Soltis, 221 A.2d 173, 177 (Pa. 1966) (using the phrase "as a
result of' to reflect proximate causation); Hamil v. Bashline, 364 A.2d 1366, 1369 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1976) (equating "as a result of' with causation), vacatedon other grounds, 392
A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
41. See Smith v. Windsor Group, 750 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Under
Pennsylvania law, the five elements of common law fraud are "(1) a misrepresentation;
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Reliance and causation are distinct concepts under Pennsylvania
law.42 Reliance in a fraud context typically requires a plaintiff to show
that an event "constituted a material inducement," even if it was not the
sole inducement, and that the reliance was reasonable.43 In the context of
a UTPCPL claim, this may be a significant hurdle to overcome. To
establish causation, in contrast, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's
negligent act or failure to act was "a substantial factor in bringing about
the plaintiffs harm" and that the plaintiff's injury would not have been
sustained in the absence of the defendant's negligence.4 4
The difference between reliance and causation has been explained
as follows: "Causation differs from reliance, although both elements
contemplate a nexus with defendant's misconduct. Causation requires a
nexus between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiffs loss; reliance
concerns the nexus between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiffs
purchase or sale."45
To illustrate the difference between causation and reliance, let us
return to our Dizz-Away example in which Dizz-Away, Inc., mounted a
successful, yet false, advertising campaign that increased demand for its
product, thereby driving up Dizz-Away's price. If the advertisements
constituted a material inducement to convince an individual who saw
(2) a fraudulent utterance thereof; (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will
thereby be induced to act; (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient on the misrepresentation
and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result." Id.
42. See, e.g., Edward J.DeBartolo Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F. Supp. 557,
562 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the difference between causation and reliance); Neuman
v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 51 A.2d 759, 765 (Pa. 1947) (distinguishing
between causation and reliance); Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) ("Causation does not require reliance.").
43. Highmont Music Corp. v. J. M. Hoffmann Co., 155 A.2d 363, 366 (Pa. 1959)
(quoting Neuman, 51 A.2d at 759); see also In re Thorne's Estate, 25 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa.
1942) ("No one is deceived by a declaration he disbelieves."); Moore v. Steinman
Hardware Co., 179 A. 565, 566 (Pa. 1935) ("[A] buyer or seller is not entitled to rely on
such statements where he has an equal opportunity to ascertain the facts affecting the
value of the thing to be sold.").
44. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1284 (citations omitted); see also Matos v. Rivera, 648 A.2d
337, 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that, to establish proximate causation, a plaintiff
must show that "the conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the
defendants should be legally responsible").
45. 17 J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER
THE 1993 ACT § 6.120 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2001); see also David Cowan Bayne, Insider
Trading: The Essence of the Insider's Duty, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 315, 329 n.38 (1993)
(explaining why "[clausation is related to but distinct from reliance"); Jeffrey A. Lovitky,
Understanding Causation and Determining the Price Adjustment in Defective Pricing
Cases, 17 PUB. CONT. L.J. 407, 413 (1988) (providing examples to illustrate the
difference between causation and reliance); Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Note, Rule lOb-5
Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory To Determine Net Economic
Loss, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 838, 845 n.31 (1983) (discussing the "distinct" elements of
reliance and causation).
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them to purchase the product, the individual would be able to show
reliance and could likely recover the entire sales price. In contrast, a
second consumer who did not see the ads could not establish reliance,
but might nonetheless establish "causation." If the consumer could show
that the increased demand resulting from the advertisements increased
the product's price, that individual could establish that the false
advertisements increased the costs of the product and could recover
damages equal to that increase. Thus, requiring reliance would bar the
second plaintiff from recovering, while requiring only causation may
permit both of the plaintiffs to recover.
3.

Class Actions

The distinction between reliance and causation is particularly
relevant when considering private class actions under the UTPCPL. In
determining whether to certify a class, a Pennsylvania court must
consider whether the class's claims raise common questions of law and
fact.46 The burden of establishing commonality is satisfied where "the
class members' legal grievances arise out of the same practice or course
of conduct on the part of the class opponent. 4 7 While proving reliance
on a class-wide level will frequently raise individual issues of fact, thus
often precluding certification,48 the challenge of satisfying the element of
causation on a class-wide basis is less formidable, although it still may
pose difficulties. 49 Returning to our Dizz-Away false advertising
46. PA. R. Ctv. P. 1702(2).
47. Foust v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 756 A.2d 112, 118 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)); see
also Allegheny County Hous. Auth. v. Berry, 487 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
("The common question of fact means precisely that the facts must be substantially the
same so that proof as to one claimant would be proof as to all."); D'Amelio v. Blue
Cross, 500 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citations omitted) ("While the
existence of individual questions is not necessarily fatal, it is essential that there be a
predominance of common issues shared by all class members which can be justly
resolved in a single proceeding.").
48. See, e.g., Klemow v. Time, Inc., 352 A.2d 12, 16 n.17 (Pa. 1976) (stating that,
because a showing of reliance would normally vary from person to person, a cause of
action for fraud is not generally appropriate for resolution in a class action); cf
JONATHAN SHELDON & DANIEL A. EDELMAN, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS: A PRACTICAL
LITIGATION GUIDE § 9.3.4.2 (4th ed. 1999) (advising consumer class action plaintiffs to
avoid claims that require proof of reliance). But see PENNSYLVANIA CONSUMER LAW
§ 2.8.2 (Carolyn L. Carter ed., 1997) [hereinafter Carter] (arguing that current law allows
an inference of reliance, permitting certification of fraud class actions); Samuel
Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 1633, 1643 (2000) [hereinafter Issacharoff 2000] (same).
49. Proving causation, even where it is required on an individual level, has not been
an obstacle to certifying a class in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Sharkus v. Blue Cross, 431
A.2d 883 (Pa. 1981); Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
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campaign example once more, a plaintiff could establish through the
testimony of an expert microeconomist that the false advertisements of
Dizz-Away, Inc., caused damage to all members of the class, while proof
of each class member's reliance on the false advertisement would likely
present individual questions of fact, including the basic question of
whether each individual even saw or heard the advertisement.
Nationally, it is clear that most state consumer protection statutes
have dispensed with the onerous burden of requiring that private
plaintiffs prove individual reliance and many, if not most, of the
remaining elements of fraud.5 ° Commentators agree with this assessment
50. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534-35 (Alaska
1980) (actual injury and intent not required); Cearley v. Wieser, 727 P.2d 346, 348 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (scienter not required); Chem v. Bank of Amer., 544 P.2d 1310, 1316
(Cal. 1976) (intent not required); Associated Inv. Co. v. Williams Assocs. IV, 645 A.2d
505, 510 (Conn. 1994) (intent and reliance not required); Stephenson v. Capano Dev.,
Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983) (reliance and intent to misrepresent, to make a
deceptive or untrue statement and to induce action not required); Davis v. Powertel, Inc.,
776 So. 2d 971, 973-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (individual reliance not required);
Regency Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 391 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (intent not
required); State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122-23 (Idaho
1980) (actual damage, reliance and intent not required); Roche v. Fireside ChryslerPlymouth, Mazda, Inc., 600 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (111 App. Ct. 1992) (intent not required);
Salkfeld v. V.R. Bus. Brokers, 548 N.E.2d 1151, 1160 (I11.App. Ct. 1989) (reliance not
required); State ex rel. Miller v. Hydro Mag, Ltd., 436 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 1989)
(reliance, intent and damages not required); Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 676
P.2d 744, 748 (Kan. 1984) (intent and scienter not required); Gehring v. Kansas Dep't. of
Transp., 886 P.2d 370, 374 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (intent not required); Sparks v. Re/Max
Allstar Realty, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (intent not required);
Telcom Directories, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan, 833 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991) (actual deception not required); Thomas J. Sibley, P.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 1526, 1531-32 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (construing Louisiana law) (intent
not required); Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 200 (Me. 1979) (intent not required); Golt
v. Phillips, 517 A.2d 328, 332-33 (Md. 1986) (scienter not required); Bond Leather Co. v.
Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., 764 F.2d 928, 937 n.6 (1st Cir. 1985) (construing Massachusetts
law) (intent not required); Giannasca v. Everett Aluminum, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 596, 599
(Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (intent not required); Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415
N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 1987) (reliance not required); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip
Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Minn. 2001) (reliance not required); Church of the
Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 612 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (intent
not required); State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 828, 837 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) (intent and reliance not required); State ex reL Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756
S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (reliance not required); Fenwick v. Kay Amer.
Jeep, Inc., 371 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 1977) (intent not required); Byrne v. Weichert Realtors,
675 A.2d 235, 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (reliance not required); Gennari v.
Weichert Co. Realtors, 672 A.2d 1190, 1205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (scienter
not required); Page & Wirtz Constr. Co. v. Solomon, 794 P.2d 349, 354 (N.M. 1990)
(intent not required); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892, 897 (N.Y. 1999)
(reliance not required); Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland
Bank, N.A., 657 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (intent not required); Marshall v. Miller,
276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981) (intent not required); Canady v. Mann, 419 S.E.2d 597,
602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (proof of fraud not required); Hubbard v. Bob McDorman
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and have noted that the model and uniform acts promulgated in the 1960s
had as a goal the elimination of the requirement of proving fraudulent
intent, reliance, and other requirements of common law fraud."
Moreover, the FTCA and the Lanham Act, on which most consumer
protection
laws are based, do not require proof of individual reliance or
52
intent.
Chevrolet, 662 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (intent not required); Sanders v.
Francis, 561 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Or. 1971) (reliance not required for certain causes of
action); Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 363 S.E.2d 691, 692 (S.C. 1988)
(intent and proof of common law fraud not required); Smith v. Scott Lewis Chevrolet,
Inc., 843 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (intent and scienter not required); Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (intent not required); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691
S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (reliance not required); Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 513 A.2d
1168, 1172-73 (Vt. 1986) (intent not required); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 535 (Wash. 1986) (intent not required); State v.
Imperial Mktg., 472 S.E.2d 792, 803 (W. Va. 1996) (reliance not required to establish
statutory element of material misrepresentation); State v. Clausen, 313 N.W.2d 819, 827
(Wis. 1982) (intent not required).
51. Richard F. Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive
Trade PracticesAct, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 495 (1967) [hereinafter Dole 1967]; see also
SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, § 4.2.12 (discussing reliance under state consumer
protection statutes); SHELDON & EDELMAN, supra note 48, § 1.5.3 (noting that, "because
a showing of individual reliance is generally not required under UDAP statutes, as to
these claims, the requirements of commonality and predominance are more easily
satisfied"); Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota's Tobacco Case: Recovering
Damages Without Individual Proofof Reliance Under Minnesota'sConsumer Protection
Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 567, 595-608 (1999) (summarizing case law and
arguments that reliance is not necessary for consumer protection claims); Elizabeth A.
Dalberth, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Real Estate Transactions: The
Duty To Disclose Off-Site Environmental Hazards, 97 DICK. L. REV. 153, 158 (1992)
("[T]he elements of UDAP statutes are easier to prove than the elements of common law
fraud because many do not require proof of intent to defraud, reliance, actual damage, or
even actual sale."); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission
Jurisprudence,48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 536 (1980) ("[R]eliance need not be pleaded
or proven to establish a UDAP violation for deceptive practices.").
52. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965) (quoting FTC
v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942) ("[W]hen the Commission finds deception it is
also authorized, within the bounds of reason, to infer that the deception will constitute a
material factor in a purchaser's decision to buy."); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d
939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that, with regard to a Lanham Act claim, "[w]hen a
merchandising statement or representation is literally or explicitly false, the court may
grant relief without reference to the advertisement's impact on the buying public"); FTC
v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993) ("It is well established with regard
to section 13 of the FTC Act (which gives district courts the power to order equitable
relief) that proof of individual reliance by each purchasing customer is not needed.");
Accu-Sort Sys., Inc. v. Lazerdata Corp., 820 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("[A]
plaintiff may make out a case under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without reference to
the advertisement's impact on the buying public if an assertion about a product in the
advertisement is false on its face."); cf FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81
(1934) (noting that a practice may come within the purview of the FTCA "though the
practice condemned does not amount to fraud as understood in courts of law").
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Given the difficulties in proving class-wide individual reliance,
imposing such an obligation is also at odds with the policies favoring the
use of class actions to resolve consumer disputes. Courts, commentators
and the NCCUSL concur that class actions are a particularly efficacious
way to resolve deceptive trade practices claims, 3 an opinion that is
echoed implicitly in the comments to the Pennsylvania class action
rules.5 4 The reasons for this are manifold:
[B]oth governmental and NGO oversight are inherently limited
and.., their effectiveness may be complemented by enlisting
capable private enforcement. Effective private enforcement in turn
requires mechanisms to aggregate the small and diffuse claims of
consumers, lest the small stake of each individual present an
insurmountable hurdle for engaging private actors. Unfortunately,
the same requirement of coordination that state entities are unable to
meet also decisively hampers the capacity for private enforcement of
consumer claims by the affected consumers themselves.
In order for consumers to advocate on their own behalf, there
must be a mechanism to coordinate diverse consumers, to compel
their cooperation so as to be able to pool resources against financially
superior opponents, and to exact the costs of participation from all the
participants in the enforcement effort so as to prevent "free riding" the refusal of some to pay on the assumption that someone else will
carry the ball. The most effective mechanism for aggregating
consumer claims is the class action. This is a point that has clear

53. See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 321, 332 (W.D.
Mich. 2000); Clark v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 247, 250
(N.D. Ill. 1999); Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Vasquez v. Superior Court, 434 P.2d 964, 968-69 (Cal. 1971); Pitts v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co.,
550 S.E.2d 179, 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Carroll v. Cellco P'ship, 713 A.2d 509, 514
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 100304 (Ohio 1998); Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., Inc., 574 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991); SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, § 8.5; SHELDON & EDELMAN, supra
note 48, §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.2; MARGARET C. JASPER, CONSUMER RIGHTS LAw 28 (1997);
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1970, supra note 17, at 144; Issacharoff 1999, supra note
33, at 137; Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
267 (1995); James E. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1. Considerations of
Procedure,49 B.U. L. REv. 407,408 (1969).
54. The 1977 Explanatory Note to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1711 states
that the "special circumstances" provision allowing a court to use an "opt-in" notice
procedure, as opposed to an "opt-out" procedure, "may never be applied to conventional
consumer class actions involving numerous members of a class claiming only small
amounts who could not conduct their own litigation." PA. R. Clv. P. 1711 note
(Explanatory Note -1997). The logical inference from this comment is that the drafters of
Rule 1711 recognized the importance of resolving the claims of as many consumers
through a class action as possible, lest their injuries go unadressed.
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55
authority in U.S. law, as emphasized by the Supreme Court.

Not only does the requirement of showing reliance thwart consumers
bringing small individual suits, but it also confers unearned benefits on
rogue businesses and individuals:
Consumer class actions serve an important function in our judicial
system and can be a major force for economic justice. They often
provide the only effective means for challenging wrongful business
conduct, stopping that conduct, and obtaining recovery of damages
caused to the individual consumers in the class. Frequently, many
consumers are harmed by the same wrongful practice, yet individual
actions are impracticable because the individual recovery would be
insufficient to justify the expense of bringing a separate lawsuit.
Without class actions, wrongdoing businesses would be able to profit
from their misconduct and retain their ill-gotten gains. Class actions
by consumers aggregate their power, enable them to take on
economically-powerful
institutions, and make wrongful conduct less
56
profitable.

Promoting consumer class actions is advantageous not only for the
consumers but for the court system as well; to the extent that class
members are forced to bring individual actions, their claims would likely
be highly duplicative and a burden on the court system and illustrate the
problems that class actions are intended to solve.57
Thus, unless
consumers are empowered to bring a class action, a would-be defendant
may reap the benefit of its improper conduct that caused the would-be
55. Issacharoff 1999, supra note 33, at 136 (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980)).
56. Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, Standards and Guidelines for Litigating
and Settling Consumer Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1997); see also Phillips
Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions also may permit the
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For
example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff, most of the
plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.");
SHELDON & EDELMAN, supra note 48, § 1.1.1 (stating that "[c]lass actions are far more
effective than an individual consumer case in forcing the defendant to modify its general
illegal business behavior, thus preventing future harm to the consumer public"). The
advantages that a class action affords consumer is even more striking when compared
with the inadequacies of other methods of acting against unfair and deceptive practices.
See, e.g., Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 574 N.E.2d 760, 766 (111.Ct. App.
1991) ("The alternatives to the class action-private suits or governmental actions-have
been so often found wanting in controlling consumer frauds that not even the ardent
critics of class actions seriously contend that they are truly effective.").
57. See, e.g., Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(quoting Temple Univ. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 374 A.2d 991 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1997)) ("In determining numerosity, the court should examine 'whether the number of
potential individual plaintiffs would pose a grave imposition on the resources of the court
and an unnecessary drain on the energies and resources of the litigants."').
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class members' injuries, and the court system would likely be flooded
with small, individual claims. For these reasons, the drafters of the
Consumer Protection Act and the corresponding state statutes also
specifically contemplated an integral role for consumer class actions,5 8
implying that the Consumer Protection Act and its progeny dispensed
or bar
with those elements of common law fraud that would complicate
59
reliance.
individual
of
proof
including
such a proceeding,
Despite this evidence from outside the Commonwealth,
Pennsylvania continues to grapple with the question of whether the
UTPCPL requires proof of common law fraud and reliance to sustain all,
some or none of the claims permitted. The Pennsylvania legislative
materials relating to the UTPCPL itself give ammunition to both sides of
the argument, but lend distinct credence to the position that the UTPCPL
does more than address and incorporate common law fraud. Although
the legislators refer to "fraud" and "fraudulent acts," 60 the overall focus
of the UTPCPL is on "consumer protection," 6 1 and one provision is
specifically characterized as being a "breach of contract" provision.6 2
One discussion in the legislative materials is particularly telling.
During the course of the debate on the UTPCPL in the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, Representative H. Sheldon Parker offered an
amendment that would prohibit gasoline vendors from engaging in
promotional games of chance.63 Essentially, gas station owners were
being compelled by oil and gas corporations and suppliers to provide
lottery and raffle tickets as part of an advertising scheme. 64 The expense
of these games was borne by gas station owners, who, in turn, passed the

58. Section 8 of the 1970 Consumer Protection Act promulgated by NCCUSL
expressly provides for private actions because "ordinarily, the amount involved in a
consumer transaction is not sufficient to interest a private practitioner, with the result that
thousands of consumers suffer small losses, without remedy or relief being available."
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1970, supra note 17, at 144; see also SHELDON &
EDELMAN, supra note 48, § 9.3.4.2; Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 51, at 549-51
(discussing "the importance of class suits to the effective enforcement of UDAP
proscriptions"); Richard F. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L. J. 1101, 1114 (1968) [hereinafter Dole
1968].
59. Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 51, at 550-51 (stating that the issue of

commonality in consumer class actions should not preclude certification of consumers'
UDAP class actions because, "[g]iven the adoption of the federal deception and
unfairness standards by many state courts, a number of questions upon which defense
counsel traditionally have made successful arguments on the predominance issue, for
example, intent, reliance and knowledge, simply will be irrelevant").
60.

1 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1159, 1161 (1968).

61.

Id. at 1160.

62.
63.

1 PA. SENATE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1798 (1976).
1 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1158-59 (1968).

64.

Id at 1159, 1163.
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costs on to gasoline consumers by raising the price of gasoline. 65 Under
these circumstances, a consumer was injured by purchasing gasoline at
the inflated price, whether or not the consumer saw or heard a
misrepresentation, let alone relied on it.
However, nowhere did
supporters of the amendment contend that the conduct did not violate the
UTPCPL. Instead, they saw these particular games as being inherently
harmful and felt that they should be preemptively banned.
What is especially instructive is the way in which the arguments in
opposition to Representative Parker's amendment were articulated. Most
detractors objected primarily to the amendment's narrow focus and to the
lack of evidence to support the proponent's allegations. However, one
opponent, Representative Robert J. Butera, stated that he believed that
the Bureau of Consumer Protection 66 was empowered to investigate the
acts asserted and that the amendment was unnecessarily specific:
We are attempting to create a Bureau of Consumer Protection,
and this bureau should have authority to look into games such as this,
to ban them themselves, to recommend legislation, perhaps, if that is
necessary, or to determine whether any statute of this Commonwealth
is being violated. It is the Consumer Protection Bureau which we are
clothing with powers to look into areas where the consumer is being
defrauded
or, if not defrauded,perhaps, being confused with this kind
67
ofgame.
This language suggests that the intent of the legislature was not to
incorporate the elements of common law fraud into the UTPCPL, but to
classify harmful misrepresentations as UTPCPL violations even in the
absence of reliance and other elements of fraud.
From the evidence of the intentions of the drafters of the Consumer
Protection Act, the conclusions reached by courts across the United
65. Id. at 1160-61. House members also asserted that the games were rigged and that
oil and gas companies received more for contest entry tickets than they paid out in prizes.
Id. at 1159-62.
66. The Bureau of Consumer Protection was created at the same time as the
UTPCPL's enactment. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, P.L. 1224,
1968 Pa. Laws 386. The powers and duties of the Bureau of Consumer Protection
substantially track the language of the UTPCPL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 307-2 (West
2001) (stating that the purposes of the Bureau of Consumer Protection are, in part, "[t]o
investigate commercial and trade practices in the distribution, financing and furnishing of
goods and services to or for the use of consumers in order to determine if such practices
are detrimental to the public interest" and "[t]o investigate fraud, misrepresentation and
deception in the sale, servicing and financing of consumer goods and products"); see also
id. § 307-3 (discussing the overlap of the roles of the Bureau of Consumer Protection and
the Pennsylvania attorney general); Packel ex rel. Commonwealth v. Shults, 362 A.2d
1129 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (discussing joint work of Bureau of Consumer Protection
and attorney general under the UTPCPL).
67. 1 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1163 (1968) (emphasis added).
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States, the commentary of experts, and the legislative history of the
UTPCPL itself, it appears that the UTPCPL is not merely a restatement
of Pennsylvania's previously existing common law fraud. Nonetheless,
Pennsylvania's courts have struggled to take a uniform and consistent
approach to this issue and have failed to embrace the intent of the
UTPCPL with a consistent body of precedent.
III. Reliance and Causation Under the UTPCPL in Pennsylvania's
Courts before Weinberg
The debate over whether all UTPCPL claims sound in fraud, thus
requiring proof of reliance, or whether certain UTPCPL claims require
only proof of causation, is best seen in an examination of the caselaw
preceding Weinberg. Because section 9.2 was not enacted until 1976, the
early UTPCPL cases are all suits brought by the Pennsylvania attorney
general in the Commonwealth's name.
The first published appellate decision to address the UTPCPL was
Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Industries, Inc.68 In Hush-Tone, the
Pennsylvania attorney general brought suit against a purveyor of hearing
aids for committing fraud and false advertising, and violating the
Catchall Provision by making representations as to the novelty and
abilities of the hearing aids.
The Hush-Tone court first considered the attorney general's section
2(4)(v) false advertising claim and, relying on decisions under the FTCA,
stated that the elements of such a claim were "(1) that defendants'
advertisement is a false representation of a fact, (2) that it actually
deceives or has a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its
audience, and (3) that the false representation is likely to make a
difference in the purchasing decision.' '69 Because the attorney general
established each of these elements, the court held that the defendants had
engaged in acts specified in section 2(4)(v) and had thus violated the
UTPCPL. 70 However, the court found no fraud or violations of the
Catchall Provision because the attorney general failed to prove "that any
of defendants [had] not believe[d] the Hush-Tone devices were or would
do what was claimed" or that the defendants had engaged in "fraudulent
conduct creating a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. 7 1
The distinction drawn between the attorney general's false
advertising claim and Catchall Provision/fraud claim is noteworthy. The
fact that the court found the attorney general's claim sustainable reveals
68.
69.
70.
71.

4 Pa. Commw. 1(1971).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at24.
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that section 2(4)(v) itself did not incorporate common law fraud,
including the element of reliance. The court's specific finding that the
defendants had believed that the advertisements were accurate and
correct negates the common law fraud requirement of scienter, showing
that the court considered the conduct specified in section 2(4)(v) for false
advertising to be distinct from fraud. This contrasts with the court's
approach to the attorney general's fraud and Catchall Provision claims,
which the court found insufficient because of a lack of evidence of
scienter, and hints that an attorney general must establish fraud under
both of the latter types of claims.
The Hush-Tone court's avoidance of the elements of fraud for
certain UTPCPL claims but not others is consistent with Packel ex rel.
Commonwealth v. Tolleson.72
In Tolleson, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court examined the attorney general's assertion that the
defendants engaged in an illegal sales referral system and ultimately
concluded that the defendant's actions "caused a likelihood of confusion
or misunderstanding in violation of section 2(4)(ii) and section 2(4)(iii)
of the act.",73 Once again, a discussion of reliance, as well as the other
elements of fraud, is absent from the review of the attorney general's
2(4)(ii), (iii) and (v) claims. Also as in Hush-Tone, the court stated that
the offending conduct "smacks of fraud ' 74 and discussed reliance and
fraudulent conduct
in its survey of the attorney general's Catchall
75
Provision claims.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's first foray into the UTPCPL
battle, in Creamer ex rel. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties,
Inc., 76 did little to clarify the required elements for a UTPCPL claim.
The court began by discussing the nature of the UTPCPL in general
terms:
The Legislature sought by the Consumer Protection Law to
benefit the public at large by eradicating, among other things, "unfair
or deceptive" business practices. Just as earlier legislation was
designed to equalize the position of employer and employee and the
position of insurer and insured, this Law attempts to place on more
equal terms seller and consumer. These remedial statutes are all
predicated on a legislative recognition of the unequal bargaining
power of opposing forces in the marketplace. Instantly, the
Legislature strove, by making certain modest adjustments, to ensure
the fairness of market transactions. No sweeping changes in legal
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

321 A.2d 664 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id at 696-97.
329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974).
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relationships were occasioned by the Consumer Protection Law,
since prevention of deception and the exploitation of unfair
advantage has always been an object of remedial legislation.
Although the Consumer Protection Law did articulate the evils
desired to be remedied, the statute's underlying foundation is fraud
prevention....
Since the Consumer Protection Law was in relevant part designed
to
to thwart fraud in the statutory sense, it is to be construed liberally
77
effect its object of preventing unfair or deceptive practices.
Significantly, the Supreme Court followed the Commonwealth Court's
earlier lead and found both the FTCA and the Lanham Act, each of
to be
which eliminates the requirements of individual reliance,
78
interpretation."
and
"guidance
for
both
to
looked
and
persuasive
Toward the conclusion of its discussion, the court commented on
the relationship between the UTPCPL and actions at common law:
We cannot presume that the Legislature when attempting to
control unfair and deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce intended to be strictly bound by common-law formalisms.
Rather the more natural inference is that the Legislature intended the
reading-a
Consumer Protection Law to be given a pragmatic
79
reading consistent with modem day economic reality.
In spite of these broad comments, however, Monumental Propertiesgave
no guidance concerning whether a UTPCPL claim requires proof of each
element of fraud.
It is hard to ignore the conflicting lessons that can be drawn from
Monumental Properties. Several times in the decision, the court paid
special attention to the fraud basis of the UTPCPL and even noted that
the UTPCPL brought few changes to Pennsylvania law.80 At the same

77. Id. at 815-17 (footnotes and citations omitted).
78. Id. at 818 (citation and quotation marks omitted). This is in keeping with the
practices of most states. See Jack L. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade
Practices Under "Little FTC Acts": Should Federal Standards Control? 94 DICK. L.
REv. 373, 389 (1990) (noting that "twenty-six states either judicially or statutorily
mandate that state courts look to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts when determining what constitutes a deceptive trade act or practice
under the state's Little FTC Acts"). However, this practice of looking to FTCA cases has
not been without its critics. See generally, e.g., Sovern, supra note 31.
79. Monumental Properties,329 A.2d at 822.
80. Id. at 816 ("No sweeping changes in legal relationships were occasioned by the
consumer protection law, since prevention of deception and exploitation of unfair
advantage has always been an object of remedial legislation.").
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time, however, the liberal interpretations ascribed to the UTPCPL, 81 as
well as its broad goals and clear break with common law actions, imply
that the statute does not require proof of each element of common law
fraud. Instead of resolving questions about the UTPCPL, the Supreme
Court sowed the seeds of increased debate over the statute's nature and
the requirements for actions brought thereunder.
Rather than providing clarity, the Supreme Court in Monumental
Properties fed the ensuing debate in the UTPCPL's early years as to
whether a specific UTPCPL claim of the attorney general or, after 1976,
a private individual, requires proof of common law fraud in general and
of reliance specifically. As a result, the outcome of subsequent decisions
diverged.
One subsequent line of cases in both the state and federal courts of
the Commonwealth held that, under the UTPCPL, "[n]either the
intention to deceive nor actual deception need be proved. All that is
required is a showing that the acts and practices are capable of being
interpreted in a misleading way."82 These cases often fixed on the
statement in Monumental Propertiesthat the UTPCPL is to be construed
liberally and that decisions under the FTCA and the Lanham Act were
persuasive.8 3 Because of these rules of construction and because an
FTCA claim did not require proof of common law fraud, these courts
imposed a relatively relaxed burden on attorneys general and plaintiffs
seeking to invoke the UTPCPL.
In contrast, a similar number of decisions embraced the
requirements of fraud and held both the attorney general and individual
plaintiffs to the Pennsylvania pleading rules applicable to fraud claims.84

81. Id.
82. Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 115, 120
(Mercer 1983) (citing Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Montgomery Ward Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1967); Resort Car Rentals
Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also In re Andrews, 78 B.R. 78, 83

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting the argument that "actual fraud is a necessary element
of a cause of action under UDAP"); Commonwealth v. Emdeko Int'l, Inc., 5 Pa. Commw.
479, 481 (1972) ("[W]e see no need to apply the relatively severe tests applied to a

complaint in trespass based on fraud to a complaint in equity under the 'Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law."').
83. Andrews, 78 B.R. at 82-83; Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 119-20.
84.

See, e.g., DiTeodoro v. J.G. Durand Int'l, 566 F. Supp. 273, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1983)

(holding that a purchase serving as the basis for a private UTPCPL claim "must be made
in reliance on the deceptive practice alleged."); Chatham Racquet Club v. Zimmerman ex
rel. Commonwealth, 541 A.2d 51, 54 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (reversing trial court's
grant of a UTPCPL preliminary injunction because the circumstances did not establish
fraud or fraudulent conduct, as required under the Catchall Provision); Zimmerman ex rel
Commonwealth v. Nat'l Apartment Leasing Co., 519 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986) (noting that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b) requires that fraud be
stated with particularity and sustaining objections to Catchall Provision claim asserting
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These decisions have little analysis, but appear to be based on the
statement in Monumental Properties that the UTPCPL has its basis in
fraud and fraud prevention. 85 Interestingly, these decisions did not
analyze a plaintiffs claims against each element of common law fraud
but rather tended to make conclusory statement that no fraud has been
proven.
An attempt to harmonize these early cases reveals that courts
regarded the UTPCPL generally as fraud-based, but would nevertheless
frequently ignore the elements of fraud, including reliance, when
examining the sufficiency of a UTPCPL claim. Significantly, none of
the decisions focused on this potential conflict or engages in an extensive
discussion of the nature of the UTPCPL. Additionally, no distinction
was made between private plaintiffs and attorneys general or between
This
claims made under different portions of section 2(4).
understandably led to a certain level of confusion as to what degree of
causation or reliance was necessary to establish a UTPCPL claim under
the statute as a whole and under each paragraph of section 2(4).
The first case to examine the UTPCPL's underlying character in
depth was Gabriel v. O'Hara,86 which confronted the question of which
statute of limitations should apply to UTPCPL claims. Citing the
statement in Monumental Propertiesthat the underlying purpose of the
UTPCPL is fraud prevention, the trial court had applied Pennsylvania's
two-year tort and fraud statute of limitations.87 The Superior Court
commented that this conclusion presented a potential for conflict with a
decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
which a one-year libel statute of limitations had been invoked to bar a
plaintiff's commercial disparagement claim under section 2(4)(viii). 8
The Superior Court first expressed its disagreement with the method
employed by both the trial court and the District Court, and noted the
multifaceted nature of the claims available under the UTPCPL:
The analysis employed by both the federal district court in Merv
Swing and by the lower court in the case at bar in selecting a statute
of limitations for the UTPCPL involved application of the most
closely analogous limitations period. This approach, however,

insufficient particularity).
85. Nat'l Apartment Leasing Co., 519 A.2d at 1052-53.
86. 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
87. Id. at 493 (noting that the trial court had applied 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(b)
to the UTPCPL claim before it); see also Cramer v. Inter-County Hospitalization Plan
Inc., 46 Pa. D. & C.3d 288, 290 (Lancaster 1986) (applying two-year statute of
limitations to UTPCPL claim).
88. Gabriel, 534 A.2d at 493 (reviewing Merv Swing Agency, Inc. v. Graham Co.,
579 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
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yielded inconsistent determinations. We believe that this result is
directly attributable to the sui generis nature of the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law since the statute
encompasses an array of practices which might be analogized to
passing off, misappropriation, trademark infringement, disparagement, false advertising, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of
warranty. Consequently, the use of the standard employed by the
trial court in the case at bar to select a limitations period threatens a
multiplicity of potentially applicable statutes of repose for UTPCPL
actions. Plaintiffs would be uncertain as to which limitations period
governed their UTPCPL claim until the court determined whether
their claim more closely resembleds9a tort action, a contract action, or
an action under some other statute.
Because the court was "unable ...to characterize all the multifarious
claims that may be brought under the UTPCPL as 'fraud' or 'deceit,' 90
it held that Pennsylvania's six-year catchall statute of limitations applied
to all UTPCPL claims. This holding has been respected and cited
repeatedly in subsequent Pennsylvania appellate decisions, implying a
continuing acceptance of the reasoning employed by the Gabrielcourt. 9'
After Gabriel, however, the battle over UTPCPL claims only
escalated further, as courts holding that the UTPCPL required proof of
common law fraud began relying on "missing" elements of fraud to
dismiss claims. In Rizzo v. Michener,92 for example, the Superior Court
spelled out the five elements of fraud and found that an unspecified
number of the required elements were missing from the plaintiff's
Catchall Provision claim. 93 This
position was defended two years later in
94
Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim:
We have determined therefore, that in order to recover under 73
Pa.C.S. §201-2(4)(xvii), the elements of common law fraud must be
proven.

89. Gabriel,534 A.2d at 494 (footnotes omitted).
90. Id. at 495.
91. See, e.g., Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd., 941 F. Supp. 495, 499
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Gabriel to hold that the six-year statute of limitations applied to
the plaintiff's UTPCPL claim); Kramer v. Dunn, 749 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(citing Gabriel for its holding that the six-year statute of limitations applies to UTPCPL
claims); Keller v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 733 A.2d 642, 646 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
(citing Gabriel to state that "[t]he UTPCPL is governed by a six-year statute of

limitations").
92. 584 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
93. Id. at 979-80; see also In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 583 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that
the court "must measure [the alleged perpetrator's] conduct against the elements of
common law fraud"); Burkholder v. Cherry, 607 A.2d 745, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)

(holding that there could be no violation of the UTPCPL without evidence of fraud).
94.

619 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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However, in support of their contention as to the existence of
fraud in this appeal, appellants seek to convince us that there exists a
statutory fraud-one presumably where there exists no need to prove
the five well-settled elements. Instead, appellants argue that the
fundamental purpose of the catch-all provision in the statute is to
create enforceable unfair trade practice violations that do not require
proof of common law fraud.... Appellants maintain that
Monumental Propertiesclearly paves the way for the recognition of a
new legal concept-statutory fraud. Specifically, they refer to the
following language: "Since the Consumer Protection Law was in
relevant part designed to thwart fraud in the statutory sense, it is to be
construed liberally to effect its object of preventing unfair or
deceptive practices."
We believe the above language was not an attempt to redefine the
common law principle of fraud. Rather, it 95
was a reference to the
numerous legislative attempts to thwart fraud.
Even attorney general claims were not immune from these requirements,
as seen by the Commonwealth Court's discussion in Chatham Racquet
Club v. Zimmerman ex rel. Commonwealth.9 6 There, the attorney general
failed to show that the defendant intended to engage in fraudulent
conduct, leaving him unable to establish scienter, and thus fraud, and
resulting in the dismissal of the claim. 97
On the other side of the battle, several courts continued to rely on
the FTCA approach and steadfastly held that intent and other elements of

95. Id. at 773-74 (citations omitted); see also Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617, 61920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (requiring proof of each element of common law fraud for a
claim under the Catchall Provision). As an aside, positing a distinct claim for "statutory
fraud" is not as peculiar as the Prime Meats, Inc. court seemed to believe. In Chatham
Racquet Club v. Zimmerman ex rel. Commonwealth, 561 A.2d 354 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court distinguished between common law fraud
and statutory fraud under the UTPCPL. Id. at 357. Moreover, other states had prior to
that time and have since treated deceptive conduct claims under their consumer
protection statutes as "statutory fraud" claims. See, e.g., Veldhuizen v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 839 F. Supp. 669, 676-77 (D. Minn. 1993) (applying different statutes of
limitations to common law fraud and statutory fraud claims); Peery v. Hansen, 585 P.2d
574, 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("[T]he right to rely, though a necessary element in a
common law fraud action, is not essential to a statutory fraud action in Arizona."); Young
v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975) (allowing a consumer damaged by a violation of
Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act to assert a private cause of action for "statutory fraud");
Mack v. Plaza Dewitt P'ship, 484 N.E.2d 900, 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (distinguishing
between common law fraud and statutory fraud).
96. 561 A.2d 354 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
97. Id. at 357-59; cf Zimmerman ex rel. Commonwealth v. Bell Tel. Co., 551 A.2d
602, 605 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (concluding that the attorney general's complaint
"alleges specific facts which if proven would constitute fraud").
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fraud were not required for UTPCPL claims.9 8 In DiLucido v. Terminix
International, Inc.,99 for instance, the Superior Court concluded that
claims for misappropriation, false advertising and breach of written
warranty were not fraud-based and hence did not require proof of
individual reliance. The three would-be class action plaintiffs in
DiLucido raised claims based on violations of those provisions of section
2(4) addressing misappropriation, false advertising, misrepresentation,
breach of written warranty and the Catchall Provision. 0 0 The trial court
had held that common questions of law and fact did not predominate, as
UTPCPL claims required proof of fraud, and that questions of individual
misrepresentations and reliance militated against certification.' 0
Initially, the DiLucido court acknowledged Rizzo and Prime Meat's
holdings that reliance was required under the Catchall Provision and
02
under those portions of the UTPCPL specifically addressing fraud.1
This precluded certification of a class for the claims based on
misappropriation and violations of the Catchall Provision. However, the
court cited the Gabrielcourt's finding that not all of the UTPCPL can be
characterized as fraud or deceit and found that the UTPCPL incorporated
the elements of only the specific underlying action:
If we explored the parallel actions for the deceptive conduct
delineated in section 201-2(4), we would discover various standards
for the distinct and separate deceptive practices. It would, therefore,
seem logical to apply those same standards for actions under the
corresponding subsections of 201-2(4) of the UTPCPL, so that
persons would
not be subject to differing standards for identical
03
conduct.
Because the plaintiffs' claims for misappropriation, false advertising and
breach of a written warranty were not fraud-based, the court held, these
claims did not require proof of each element of common law fraud,

98. In re Milbourne, 108 B.R. 522, 534 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Wemly, 91
B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Pirozzi v. Penske Olds-Cadillac-GMC,
Inc., 605 A.2d 373, 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the defendant's failure to
disclose that the vehicle in question had been damaged, even when the plaintiff had not
asked about the vehicle's condition, created a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding and supported a UTPCPL claim under the Catchall Provision).
99. 676 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
100. Id. at 1240. DiLucido was decided under the Catchall Provision before the term
"or deceptive" was added.
101. Id. at 1239. As a secondary argument, the trial court held that the class could not
be certified because each of the three named plaintiffs had distinctions that made them
atypical of the class as a whole. Id. at 1241-42.
102. "Id. at 1240.
103. Id.
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104
including proof of individual reliance.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate a link
between the conduct of which they complained and the damages that
they had suffered. Pointing to the language in section 9.2 that requires
that a private plaintiffs loss be "as a result of' the defendant's unlawful
conduct, the court held that the plaintiffs "must be able to establish that
10 5

the alleged misrepresentations by [the defendant]: caused their loss.

In spite of this more lenient standard, two of the plaintiffs failed to allege
the requisite causal connection, resulting in the dismissal of their claims
10 6
and the affirmance of the trial court's denial of certification.
Ironically, the DiLucido court denied the plaintiffs in the action before it
the rightto proceed, even as it laid the foundation for a path that other
UTPCPL class action plaintiffs would find easier to follow.
DiLucido appears to have established only a temporary advance in
the conflict over the requirement of showing reliance in UTPCPL
claims. 10 7 In Basile v. H & R Block, Inc.,' 0 8 the Superior Court held that
"the UTPCPL requires a showing of detrimental reliance in private
actions based on all provisions of the statute," a holding based, oddly
enough, on DiLucido itself. 0 9 Even in the face of this impediment,
however, the court found that the named plaintiffs had shown an agency
relationship with one of the defendants, thereby establishing a
presumption of reliance and allowing certification of a class." 0 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's
finding of an agency relationship, but left intact the principle that
UTPCPL reliance may be established for an entire class by showing a
fiduciary relationship."'
104.
105.

Id. at 1241.
Id.

106. Id. at 1241-42.

The third plaintiff was unable to continue the class action

because she was not typical of the class. Id.
107. Several superior court cases immediately following DiLucido adhere to its
distinction between claims brought under those portions of section 2(4) that spoke of
fraud and misrepresentation, which required proof of each element of common law fraud,
and claims brought under other portions, which did not. Compare Sewak v. Lockhart,
699 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (applying elements of common law fraud to
Catchall Provision claim), with Fay v. Erie Ins. Group, 723 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (analyzing plaintiff's false advertising claim using the DiLucido causal connection
test).
108. 729 A.2d 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), vacated in part and remanded in part, 761
A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000).
109. Basile, 729 A.2d at 584.
110. Id.
111. Basile, 761 A.2d at 1122. Indeed, the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
remanded for consideration as to whether the parties' relationship gave rise to a
confidential relationship, the existence of which would have created a presumption of
reliance, indicates that the Supreme Court's support for the argument that a confidential
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Although Basile appears to set forth a strong and decisive
requirement for showing reliance for a UTPCPL claim, a close
examination of the Superior Court's discussion reveals an
interchangeable use of the terms "reliance" and "causation":
To state a cause of action under the UTPCPL, Plaintiffs must
establish that they suffered an "ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by
any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section
3 of [the Act]." 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. Interpreting this provision, we
have found that "the use of the phrase 'as a result of indicates the
intent of the Legislature to require a causal connection between the
unlawful practice and a plaintiffs loss." To demonstrate causation
on their claims against Mellon, Plaintiffs [sic] must demonstrate that
they relied to their detriment on Mellon's actions in obtaining and
processing their RAL applications and issuing RALs. DiLucido,
supra, at 1241.112

This discussion, along with the fact that Basile cites and sees itself as
being in accord with DiLucido, suggests that the Basile court's
imposition of a reliance requirement for all UTPCPL claims may be the
result of imprecise language rather than an attempt to tinker with earlier
decisions. Nevertheless, on its face, it set up a formidable challenge to
UTPCPL class actions and served as a prelude to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Weinberg.
IV. The Weinberg Decision
Weinberg marked the first time that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stepped into the UTPCPL conflict since Monumental Properties in
1974.113 The underlying dispute centered on the 93.5 and 94 octane
gasoline ("Ultra TM") of defendant Sun Oil Company ("Sun") and 1the
14
alleged misrepresentations made by Sun in connection with Ultra TM.
Between 1990 and 1992, Sun broadcast advertisements that Ultra
TM gave users the best acceleration and "maximum power and
performance" because of its high octane rating, which, at the time, was
the highest available to the general public.' 15 In reality, however, Ultra
relationship is sufficient to satisfy the reliance requirement initially.
112. Basile, 729 A.2d at 584-85 (emphasis added).
113. Although Basile reached the Supreme Court, the court did not address the
UTPCPL but rather confined its inquiries to the question of whether an agency
relationship had been formed between class members and H & R Block. Basile, 761 A.2d
at 1117.
114. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 740 A.2d 1152, 1160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), aff'd in part
and rev 'd in part,777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001).
115. Id.
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TM provided no advantage over other gasoline to most consumers, as the
majority of vehicles reap little benefit from the higher octane of Ultra
TM.' 16 This misleading representation was merely the latest in a series
of misrepresentations stretching back to the 1960s through which Sun
octane was associated
had attempted to convince consumers that 1high
7
quality."
higher
and
power
with more engine
In 1991, the FTC took action against Sun for violating a 1974
consent decree under which Sun had agreed to refrain from
misrepresenting "the performance characteristics of Sunoco gasoline or
any other gasoline."' "18 The allegations against Sun were based on its
renewed advertising that its high-octane gasolines, including Ultra TM,
provided "superior engine power and performance, a claim that was
without merit." 9 The next year, Sun agreed to a consent decree that
required it to cease making claims as to Ultra TM's superiority "in
providing engine power or acceleration" and "the relative or absolute
engine
attributes or performance of any gasoline with respect to vehicle
20
power, acceleration, or any other performance characteristic."'
After plaintiff Sheilah Guarino's Lanham Act claim against Sun
was rebuffed by the federal courts, 121 she teamed up with Frederic
Weinberg and Marc Gordon to bring a class action suit against Sun in
Pennsylvania for damages allegedly suffered as a result of Sun's
misrepresentations and false advertising. 122 Although the named
plaintiffs differed as to their recall of the advertisements, 23 they made
two assertions: (1) that Sun's misrepresentations had been a substantial
factor in their individual purchasing decision, and (2) that the
advertisements had increased the demand for Ultra TM, thereby driving
up prices and damaging even those who had not seen the
116. Id.at 1156.
117. Id. at 1157; see also In re Sun Oil Co., 84 F.T.C. 247 (1974).
118. Weinberg, 740 A.2d at 1158.
119. Id.
120. In re Sun Co., 115 F.T.C. 560 (1992).
121. Guarino v. Sun Co., 819 F. Supp. 405 (D.N.J. 1993), aff'd sub nom., Serbin v.
Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993).
122. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 740 A.2d 1152, 1160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001). After the federal court recommended that
she pursue her action in state court, Guarino initially turned to the state courts of New
Jersey. Id.When the New Jersey court certified a class of New Jersey residents only,
Guarino and her co-plaintiffs filed an action in Pennsylvania seeking certification of a
national class. Id. Sun brought this to the attention of the New Jersey court and argued
that the New Jersey class could be part of the national class in Pennsylvania and that the
New Jersey class should be decertified in the interests of judicial economy. Id. The New
Jersey court promptly decertified the class, leaving the plaintiffs with only their
Pennsylvania suit. Id.
123. Guarino and Gordon remembered seeing Sun's advertisements, while Weinberg
could not recall seeing or hearing them. Id.at 1165.
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advertisements. 124 On the basis of these allegations, the named plaintiffs
brought suit against Sun for violations of the UTPCPL 125 and sought the
certification of a class of persons who had purchased Ultra TM for
personal, family or household purposes between February 22, 1990 and
May 6, 1.992126
At the class certification hearing, Sun argued that the matter was not
appropriate for class certification because evidence of individual reliance
was required for UTPCPL claims and that proving individual reliance
would be counter to the mandate that class actions raise common
questions of law and fact.127 Because it found that all of the plaintiffs'
claims sounded in fraud, the trial court agreed with128Sun and denied class
certification, at which point the plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Superior Court addressed the following question:
Whether a claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law requires proof of a plaintiff's
actual reliance upon an allegedly false or deceptive statement even if
the false or deceptive statement caused the plaintiff monetary
29 damage
by raising the cost of the product the plaintiff purchased? 1
After reviewing Pennsylvania's class action rules and laws, the Superior
Court noted that the trial judge's findings "hinge on his conclusion that
appellants must demonstrate
reliance upon the advertisements in order to
30
fulfill the UTPCPL.'

Relying on Gabriel and DiLucido, the Superior Court found that not
all UTPCPL claims sounded in fraud and that false and bait advertising
claims were distinguishable from fraud and misrepresentation claims and
did not require a showing of reliance.' 3' The court then turned to HushTone for the elements of false advertising and held that each element had
132
been properly alleged and could be established on a class-wide basis.
124. Id. at 1160-61. The trial court found that, during the period in question, the price
of Ultra TM was at least fifteen cents higher than certain lower octane gasolines. Id. at
1164 n.18.
125. Id. at 1166.
The plaintiffs brought actions for false advertising,
misrepresentation, bait advertising, and violations of the Catchall Provision, based on
sections (4)(v), (vii), (ix) and (xviii). Id.
126. Id. at 1161.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1165.
129. Id. at 1161. The court also addressed whether a Pennsylvania court could certify
a national class. Id.
130. Id.at 1165.
131. Id. at 1166-67.
132. Id. at 1167 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Indus., Inc., 4 Pa. Commw. 1,
21 (1971)). According to the Superior Court, the elements of false advertising were "(1)
that defendants' advertisement is a false representation of a fact, (2) that it actually
deceives or has a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience, and (3) that
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At this point, the Superior Court focused on the requirement of
causation,'33 the issue that had fatally undermined the plaintiffs in
DiLucido. Returning to Hush-Tone and its reference to the FTCA, the
court held that "the requisite degree of causation is that the false
representation is likely to have made a difference in consumers'
purchasing decisions. 13 4 Because the plaintiffs could prove this at trial
through the testimony of an expert economist, the court found that the
question of causation did not render the plaintiffs incapable of
establishing common questions of fact and law and that a class could be
certified for the plaintiffs' false advertising claims.' 3 5
In a terse opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court refusal to certify the plaintiffs'
fraud and
misrepresentation claims, but reversed as to the false and bait advertising
claims.136 The Supreme Court compared the language in section 4
allowing for an attorney general UTPCPL action with the language in
section 9.2 and noted that the former allowed an action to be brought if it
would be "in the public interest," while the latter required that the private
plaintiff suffer harm "as a result of' the offending practice. 137 Because
the statutes granting the right to pursue these actions were
distinguishable, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court's
reliance on Hush-Tone for the elements of false advertising was in error
because Hush-Tone was 38an attorney general claim brought for
"protecting public interest."'
The Supreme Court then examined the question of causation more
closely:
There is no authority which would permit a private plaintiff to
pursue an advertiser because an advertisement might deceive
members of the audience and might influence a purchasing decision
when the plaintiff himself was neither deceived nor influenced.
There is certainly nothing in the statute which suggests such a private
right. The UTPCPL was enacted in 1968, and a private cause of
action was added in 1976. The UTPCPL's underlying foundation is
fraud prevention. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the
legislature ever intended statutory language directed against
consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common law elements
of reliance and causation.
the false representation is likely to make a difference in a purchasing decision." Id.
133. Weinberg, 740 A.2d at 1168-69.
134. Id. at 1170.
135. Id. at 1170-71. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court as to its denial of
certification on the plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims. Id. at 1171.
136. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442,446 (Pa. 2001).
137. Id. at 445.
138. Id. at 445-46.
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The statute clearly requires, in a private action, that a plaintiff
suffer an ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant's prohibited
action. That means, in this case, a plaintiffmust allege reliance, that

he purchased Ultra® because he heard and believed Sunoco's
139 false
advertising that Ultra® would enhance engine performance.
Because showing reliance would require resolving individual questions
of fact, which would be "numerous and extensive," the Supreme Court
held that certification on the plaintiffs' false advertising claims was
inappropriate and that the trial court's
original decision denying
40
certification as to all claims should stand. 1
There are several criticisms that can be leveled at Weinberg. As an
initial matter, portions of the UTPCPL legislative history, as well as
language in Monumental Properties, can be read to support the
elimination of common law requirements from UTPCPL claims. 14 1 In
addition, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "as a result of'
as requiring proof of reliance is at odds with earlier Pennsylvania42
decisions that construe this phrase as requiring causation, not reliance. 1
The Supreme Court's distinction between attorney general actions and
private claims is, at best, blurred, and, at worst, a radical departure from
earlier cases. 143 Moreover, the Supreme Court failed to examine a single
decision addressing the FTCA and the Lanham Act, disregarding its
44
earlier statement that FTCA and Lanham Act cases were persuasive,'
and ignored the myriad cases of other jurisdictions allowing plaintiffs
under their versions of the UTPCPL to forgo the requirement of
reliance. 145
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ignored these
inconsistencies with its decision and sent a clear message: a UTPCPL
claim brought under the portion of the statute examined by the court
must show reliance or face dismissal.

139. Id at 446 (citation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). It is worth noting
that the events underlying Weinberg took place before the 1996 Amendment became
effective, precluding the Supreme Court from examining the effect of the term
"deceptive" in the Catchall Provision.
140. Id. The Supreme Court also found that determining the price paid in each
transaction and showing that each purchase was made for personal or household
purposes, as required by section 9.2, made the matter even more inappropriate for
resolution as a class action. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67, 79.
142.
143.

See supra text accompanying note 40.
See supra text accompanying note 82; see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note

37, § 10.5.1 ("For the most part, the same standards as to whether a practice is unfair or
deceptive apply whether the state or a private individual brings the UDAP claim.").
144. See supra text accompanying note 78.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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V.

Consequences of Weinberg

It is important to recognize which UTPCPL questions Weinberg
answers and which questions it does not. In addition to reaffirming the
UTPCPL's fraud basis, the most significant outcome of Weinberg is the
clear and unequivocal signal that reliance and the other elements of
common law fraud must be shown under at least the false advertising
provision of the UTPCPL 1 46 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court drew a broad line between attorney general and private UTPCPL
actions 147 and effectively overruled the position taken by the DiLucido
court.

That said, Weinberg does not close the door on the
reliance/causation debate or on the broader question of whether all
UTPCPL claims should be classified as fraud, requiring proof of all of
the elements of such a cause of action. The Weinberg court stated that
the phrase in section 9.2, "as a result of," required proof of reliance "in
this case., 148 This allows the possibility that, in some "other" cases not
before the court, proof of reliance may not be required, and that certain
non-false advertising UTPCPL claims might not be fraud based and thus
not require proof of reliance.
Extending the Weinberg holding to all UTPCPL claims, and thus
requiring proof of reliance under all paragraphs of section 2(4), would
lead to rather peculiar results. To sustain a standard breach of written
warranty claim, for example, a plaintiff must show "that a breach of
warranty occurred and that the breach was the proximate cause of the
specific damages sustained."1 49 In contrast, in Weinberg-governed
UTPCPL breach of written warranty claims under section 2(4)(xiv),
plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate that they relied on the written
warranty in making their purchase.1 50 Effectively, this would require that
a UTPCPL breach of written warranty plaintiff be held to an additional
element not required for an ordinary breach of written warranty claim.
146. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2000).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Price v. Chevrolet Motor Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 765 A.2d 800, 809 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102 (3d
Cir. 1992); Kruger v. Subaru of Amer., Inc., 996 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
150. Of course, this begs the question as to whether a written representation is "part
of the basis of the bargain" and thus a written warranty. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2313
(2001). All of the seller's statements generally become part of the basis of the bargain
"unless good reason is shown to the contrary." Id. cmt. 8; see also Sessa v. Riegle, 427
F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code "envisioned that all statements of the seller became part of the basis of the bargain
unless clear affirmative proof is shown to the contrary"), aff'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.
1978).
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Similarly, a common law breach of contract claim requires only that
a plaintiff prove "(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential
terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant
damages."' 151 Under a broad reading of Weinberg, a UTPCPL breach of
contract claim under paragraph (xvi) would require that plaintiffs also
establish that they relied on the particular provision of the contract.
Thus, a broad application of Weinberg would lead to divergent elements
for certain standard causes of action and their UTPCPL counterparts and,
in fact, would make152UTPCPL claims more difficult to establish than
common law claims.
In addition, a broad reading of Weinberg isolates Pennsylvania from
the majority of states with regard to consumer protection law. As
discussed previously, the drafters of the Consumer Protection Act
intended to eliminate the requirements of common law fraud for
consumer actions, and most states have followed their instruction by
allowing consumer class actions even in the absence of proof of each of
its elements. 5 3 If Pennsylvania extends Weinberg and the reliance
requirement to all UTPCPL claims, it will find itself on the most
conservative fringes of consumer protection law and put Pennsylvania
residents at a serious disadvantage in comparison to out-of-state
consumers.
A possible method for avoiding this result is to emphasize that
Weinberg was decided under the pre-1996 version of the UTPCPL.
Because Weinberg did not examine the Catchall Provision in its new,
post-1996 Amendment form, the court did not have the opportunity to
determine the effect of the legislature's extension of that provision to
"deceptive" conduct. Several courts that have examined this issue have
concluded that the 1996 Amendment eliminated the requirement that a
private UTPCPL plaintiff prove each element of fraud. 15 4 Under this
151. CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
(citing General State Auth. v. Coleman Cable & Wire Co., 365 A.2d 1347, 1349 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976)).
152. Cf DiLucido v. Terminix Int'l Inc., 676 A.2d 1237, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(stating that it would be "logical" to apply the same standards for each of the "the distinct
and separate deceptive practices" set forth in section 201-2(4) to "actions under the
corresponding subsections of 201-2(4) of the UTPCPL, so that persons would not be
subject to differing standards for identical conduct").
153. See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
154. See In re Patterson, 263 B.R. 82, 91-92 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that the
1996 UTPCPL amendment eliminated the requirement of a private plaintiff to prove
common law fraud); In re Rodriguez, 218 B.R. 764, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding
that the 1996 UTPCPL amendment "signals approval of. . . less restrictive interpretations
of UDAP, and is an affirmation of the position[s]" that "the basis for liability under
UDAP was broader than an action for fraud under the common law," that the UTPCPL is
"an attempt to create a new variety of statutory fraud free from the traditional
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approach, a claimant under the Catchall Provision must establish the
causal link mandated by section 9.2 but need not show that he or she
relied on the defendant's deceptive conduct.
The reasoning behind this approach is sound. It is an "axiom of
statutory construction that 'whenever possible each word in a statutory
' 155
provision is to be given meaning and not to be treated as surplusage.'
In addition, "[a] change in the language of a statute ordinarily indicates a
change in legislative intent." 156 Here, although the legislative history of
the 1996 Amendment is generally uninformative, 157 the insertion of the
phrase "or deceptive" implies that deceptive conduct is distinct from
fraudulent conduct. Thus, if plaintiffs can show that a defendant's
actions were "deceptive," they need not establish each element of
common law fraud, including reliance, to sustain a UTPCPL claim under
the Catchall Provision.1 58 Moreover, the fact that the Catchall Provision
requirements of fraud under the common law" and that "a cause of action under the
catchall section of UDAP can be maintained by proving the existence of illegality in a
transaction"); see also Carter, supra note 48, § 2.5.4.21(B) (stating that the 1996
Amendment resolved the question of whether common law fraud must be proven to
establish a violation of the Catchall Provision and allows Catchall Provision claims
without proof of common law fraud); Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 51, at 536-37
(distinguishing between "deceptive" and "fraudulent" conduct).
155. Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted)
(quoting In re Employees of Student Services, 432 A.2d 189 (Pa. 1981)); see also
Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 777 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) ("[W]henever possible, courts must construe a statute so as to give
effect to every word contained therein.").
156. Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. 1977) (footnote and citations
omitted).
157. The legislative history of the 1996 Amendment focuses on the insertion of
language that has the effect of prohibiting telemarketing scams. Nonetheless, to the
extent that this history shows that the General Assembly intended to liberalize and to
expand the scope of the UTPCPL, it supports the conclusion that establishing the
elements of common law fraud is no longer required.
158. In In re Patterson, 263 B.R. 82 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001), the court expressed
concern that Booze v. Allstate Ins. Co., 750 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), conflicted
with this position. Patterson,263 B.R. at 91-92. In Booze, the Superior Court noted in a
footnote that the Catchall Provision had been amended, but held the plaintiff to proving
the elements of common law fraud. 750 A.2d at 880 n.6. However, a close examination
of Booze reveals that the court was relying on the pre-1996 Catchall Provision, as
evidenced by its reference to the Catchall Provision's pre-1996 roman numeral. Id.
A more likely cause for concern is Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002), in which the court reiterated the position that "[iun order to establish a violation of
this catchall provision, 'a plaintiff must prove all of the elements of common-law fraud."'
Id. at 794 (quoting Sewak v. Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
Because the Skurnowicz court referenced the Catchall Provision's current number, there
is little doubt it was addressing the post-Amendment version. However, this decision can
be both criticized and distinguished. As an initial matter, the court relied blindly on a
pre-Amendment decision and reached its conclusion without any analysis or awareness of
the Amendment. See id. at 788-94. Were subsequent authorities to be become aware of
these oversights, it would likely mute Skurnowicz's effect. Moreover, because the
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refers to "other" deceptive conduct implies that at least some of the
provisions in section 2(4) describe deceptive, not fraudulent, conduct.
This, of course, begs the question as to what constitutes "deceptive"
conduct. Because the phrase was added to the UTPCPL only recently,
there is little guidance as to how Pennsylvania courts will interpret the
term.1 59 However, the task of defining this term is not as strenuous an
undertaking as it would first appear, as there is an extensive body of case
law under the FTCA that has clarified the meaning of the term
"deceptive" as it is used in the statute. 160 Indeed, the prospect of state
agencies and individuals fighting unlawful conduct by relying on FTCA
decisions is exactly what was intended by the Consumer Protection Act
drafters and is a return to the partnership espoused in Monumental
Properties. Thus far, it appears that the most significant distinction is
that "deception" is a flexible concept that eliminates most of the
requirements of common law fraud, 6including reliance, and will allow
consumer class actions more readily.' 1
The implications of Weinberg for class actions are apparent. For
those portions of the UTPCPL that require proof of reliance, class action
plaintiffs will face the daunting task of showing how reliance may be
shown on a class-wide basis. Even a successful parallel action by an
attorney general or district attorney will be of no avail, as a court order
issued in conjunction with a section 4 action is prima facie evidence only
as to the defendant's violation of section 3, and not evidence of reliance
Skurnowicz court found that the plaintiffs had proven the elements of fraud, they almost
certainly could have satisfied the more lenient standard of causation, and the outcome of
the decision is unaffected by the differing interpretations. See id. As an additional
matter, Skurnowicz was not a class action, and there was no discussion of the effects of
reliance on certification. Indeed, the court did not mention reliance in its opinion at all,
making it extremely uncertain that the court was aware of the potential implications of its
decision. See id.
159. But see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, § 10.5.2 ("State courts follow FTC
precedent and hold that actual deception is unnecessary for a UDAP claim; only that a
practice has a capacity or is likely to deceive need be shown."); Carter, supra note 48, §
2.5.2.1 (stating that the test for deception "is the impression the act or practice is likely to
make on a person of average intelligence" and that "[w]here particularly credulous
persons are among the audience for an act or practice, its likely effect on them must be
considered").
160. For three thorough discussions and reviews of the extensive case law defining
the term "deceptive" with numerous citations, see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, §
4.2; W.J. Dunn, Annotation, What Constitutes False, Misleading, or Deceptive
Advertising or PromotionalPractices Subject to Action by Federal Trade Commission,
65 A.L.R.2d 225 (1959 & 2001 Supp.); Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Practices
Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89
A.L.R.3d 449 (1979 & 2001 Supp.).
161. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 37, § 4.2.3; Carter, supra note 48, § 2.5.2.1.
It is worth noting that "deceptive" is a narrower term than "unfair." SHELDON & CARTER,
supra note 37, § 4.3.3.1.
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or even causation.
Nevertheless, there are several techniques using presumptions and
inferences 162 that a class action plaintiff may be able to employ to survive
the formidable objections to certification. 63 The first of these methods is
to establish a relationship between the class and the defendant that
64
creates a legal presumption of reliance. In Basile v. H & R Block, Inc.,'
for example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the members of
the class had formed an agency relationship with H & R Block, creating
a presumption of reliance with regard to all matters within the scope of
the agency. 165 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
Superior Court as to whether an agency relation had been formed, 166 it
affirmed the Superior Court's understanding that an agency relationship
includes a presumption of reliance and can serve as the basis for a class
action. 16 Indeed, by remanding the matter to the Superior Court to
determine whether a confidential relationship had been formed, the
Supreme Court opened
a second front for the Basile plaintiffs in their
168
class action battle.

162. While courts often use these terms interchangeably, presumptions are distinct
from inferences:
[A]n inference is merely a logical tool which permits the trier of fact to proceed
from one fact to another. A presumption, on the other hand, is a procedural
device which not only permits an inference of the "presumed" fact, but also
shifts to the opposing party the burden of producing evidence to disprove the
presumed fact. Failure to meet this burden of production will normally result in
binding instructions on the issue of the presumed fact's existence in favor of
the party invoking the presumption.
Ackerman v. Delcomico, 486 A.2d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting
Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 329 A.2d 204, 207-08 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)); see
also Bixler v. Hovarter, 491 A.2d 958, 959 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) ("A presumption...
shifts the burden of persuasion or the burden of going forward with the evidence. An
inference, on the other hand, is simply a clear, logical, reasonable and natural conclusion
which the trier of fact may embrace or reject based on the evidence .... ).
163. See Curtis v. Olds, 95 A. 526, 527 (Pa. 1915) (citations omitted). For example,
under Pennsylvania equity law, "fraud may be inferred from attendant circumstances; it
may be presumed from the subject-matter of the contract, or from the relation of the
parties; or it may afford ground for relief when it simply affects third persons not parties
to the transaction." Id.
164. 729 A.2d 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), vacated, 761 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000).
165. Id. at 584 (citing Young v. Kaye, 279 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1971)).
166. Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1122 (Pa. 2000).
167. Id. at 1120. The Supreme Court also spelled out the requirements for
establishing an agency relationship. See id. (quoting Scott v. Purcell, 415 A.2d 56, 60
(Pa. 1980)) (stating that, in Pennsylvania, the "three basic elements of agency" are "the
manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent's acceptance of
the undertaking and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control
of the undertaking").
168. On remand, the Superior Court set forth the test for determining the existence of
a confidential relationship under Pennsylvania law:
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[t]he concept of a confidential
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This method is not without its pitfalls. The creation and scope of an
agency, fiduciary or confidential relationship is often a question of
fact. 16 9 If class action plaintiffs can show that the given relationship
came about as a result of identical or substantially similar schemes or
events, they may be able to establish reliance on a class-wide basis and to
prove that there are sufficient common questions of fact and law to
justify class certification. In the absence of such evidence, however,
establishing a relationship and a legal presumption of reliance may turn
on individual facts, which, again, is likely to preclude certification of the
class.
Second, there are certain transactions that, as a matter of law, create
a presumption that a purchaser has relied on the seller or that the
transaction itself is fraudulent. In In re Hillegass' Estate,170 for example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a court may presume that a
contracting plaintiff relied on a material misrepresentation. 17 1 Other
cases show that a court may presume that an insurer relied on the
misrepresentations of the insured in an application, 172 and that purchasers
of a home relied on a restriction in the title deed.173 There is also an
effective presumption of reliance in certain "fraud on the market"
relationship cannot be reduced to a catalogue of specific circumstances,
invariably falling to the left or right of a definitional line." In re Estate of Scott,
455 Pa. 429, 316 A.2d 883, 885 (1974).
The Court has recognized,
nonetheless, that "[tihe essence of such a relationship is trust and reliance on
one side, and a corresponding opportunity to abuse that trust for personal gain
on the other." Id. Accordingly, "[a confidential relationship] appears when the
circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the
one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness,
dependence or trust, justifiably reposed[.]" Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425
A.2d 412, 416-17 (1981) (emphasis added).
Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95, 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Ultimately, the
Superior Court held that the plaintiffs had supplied primafacieevidence of a confidential
relationship, and that H & R Block was not entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 108.
169. Maslo Mfg. Corp. v. Proctor Elec. Co., 103 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1954) ("Where
the fact of agency and the scope of authority depends on a writing, it is a question for the
court; where, as here, there is no writing, the question of agency and the scope of
authority is one for the jury."); B & L Asphalt Indus., Inc. v. Fusco, 753 A.2d 264, 269
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ("The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact.");
Rebidas v. Murasko, 677 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("The existence of a
confidential relationship, in all but a few instances ... is a question of fact to be
established by the evidence."). But see Biddle v. Johnsonbaugh, 664 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) ("A confidential relationship is deemed to exist as a matter of law
between a trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and
principal and agent.") (citations omitted).
170. 244 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1968).
171. Id. at 676 (citing In re McClellan's Estate, 75 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1950)).
172. Richardson v. Alta Life Ins. Co., 33 A.2d 783, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943) (citing
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brandwene, 172 A. 669 (Pa. 1934)).
173. Benner v. Tacony Athletic Ass'n, 196 A. 390, 392 (Pa. 1938).
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transactions, in which a purchaser presumptively relies on legitimacy of
the price offered. 7 4 Other "fraud on the market" transactions may be
presumptively fraudulent in their entirety.' 75 While these specific
presumptions may be of limited applicability to UTPCPL claims,
UTPCPL class action plaintiffs may analogize to them when arguing that
the type of transaction on which their claims are based allows a
presumption of reliance.
A third avenue for establishing class-wide reliance may be a factual
scenario or specific event that allows a court to infer reliance. There is
precedence for such inferences in the Commonwealth, as Pennsylvania
has allowed an inference of reliance when such an inference is supported
by the facts of the case.176 Applicable to UTPCPL claims generally are
decisions addressing the Lanham Act, the FTCA, the consumer
protection laws of other states, and other causes of action requiring proof
of reliance in which a single, simple event or incident triggers an
inference of reliance. For example, it has been held that, under the
Lanham Act, "[o]nce it is shown that a defendant deliberately engaged in
a deceptive commercial practice,. . . a powerful inference may be drawn
that the defendant has succeeded in confusing the public."' 177 The United

174. Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 264 A.2d 597, 603-05 (Pa. 1970) (citations omitted). "In
an efficient market the misinformation directly affects the stock prices at which the
investor trades and thus, through the inflated or deflated price, causes injury even in the
absence of direct reliance," and "[r]eliance may be presumed when a fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission impairs the value of a security traded in an efficient
market." Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 175 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, the question of whether the
UTPCPL applies to such a transaction is a matter of some disagreement, as Pennsylvania
appellate courts have yet to weigh in on the matter. But see Algrant v. Evergreen Valley
Nurseries, 126 F.3d 178, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the conditions under which
the UTPCPL would apply to a sale of securities).
175. See, e.g., Pa. Knitting Mills Corp. v. Bayard, 134 A.2d 397, 399 (Pa. 1926)
(quoting 13 COOK ON CORPORATIONS § 658 (8th ed. 1923) (stating that "transactions
between two companies having a majority or all of their directors in common are
presumptively fraudulent, unless expressly authorized or ratified by the stockholders,
especially where the transaction is to the advantage of one and at the expense of the
other").
176. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("Reliance on student loans is implicit if a plaintiff proves that he or she had no means of
attending school without financial assistance."); Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d 301,
311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Based upon reasonable inferences derivable from the
pleadings, we conclude that the Woodwards' have alleged specially foreseeable
reasonable reliance upon Smith's misrepresentations."); see also Issacharoff 2000, supra
note 48, at 1654 (arguing for "a standard that would allow for objective proof of
reasonable reliance in mass-marketed goods/services/products, regardless of the
categorization of the product in question," thus allowing "such claims to be amendable to
classwide prosecution" under certain conditions").
177. Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d
134, 140 (2d Cir. 1991).
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States Supreme Court, among other courts, has also inferred reliance
based on the materiality of an omission:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in
178
the making of this decision.
At least two states have taken this a step further and allowed an inference
of reliance on all material misrepresentations.' 7 9 In each of these cases
where certification was at issue, the relevant court held that questions of
reliance did not prevent certification of a class.180 It is unclear how well
this argument would fare, given the Weinberg decision, but it does
provide a possible route for consumers to overcome the reliance barrier
in a wide range of cases.
At other times, courts have inferred reliance from a more
complicated series of occurrences that are part of the particular facts of
the specific case. 18' In Carpenter v. Chrysler Corp., for example, the
plaintiffs did not even look at the odometer of the car they were
178. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (citing
Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). Other sources also infer reliance based upon a party's omission. See 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 3876-3880 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969); A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIEs LAW, FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5, §§ 2.6, 8.6 (1967); see also, e.g., In re Great
S. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 212, 220 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Smith v.
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665, 679 (D. Kan. 1989); Loughry v. Capel, 132
N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa 1965); Adams v. Little Mo. Minerals Ass'n, 143 N.W.2d 659,
683 (N.D. 1966); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 807, 816-17 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Issacharoff 2000, supra note 48, at 1648; cf Cope v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ohio 1998) ("It is not necessary to establish
inducement and reliance upon material omissions by direct evidence."). This inference
has been used "because of the difficulty in proving what the party would have done if it
had had the relevant information." Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 121
F.R.D. 417, 434 (D.N.M. 1988). This is not altogether different from the holding of
Pirozzi v. Penske Olds-Cadillac-GMC,Inc., 605 A.2d 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), in which
the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered a plaintiff's UTPCPL claim and inferred that
the plaintiff "relied" on the defendant's failure to disclose that the door to a vehicle had
been damaged. Id. at 376-77.
179. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 972-73 (Cal. 1971); Skalbania v.
Simmons, 443 N.E.2d 352, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); see also SHELDON & EDELMAN,
supra note 48, § 9.3.4.2 ("The current trend is to find an inference of reliance where a
material false representation is made and the plaintiffs thereafter act in a manner
consistent with the representations.").
180. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. at 214; Smith, 124 F.R.D. at 688; Vasquez, 484
P.2d at 981; Skalbania, 443 N.E.2d at 363; Varacallo, 752 A.2d at 818; Cope, 696
N.E.2d at 1009.
181. See Knop v. McMahon, 872 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1989); Carpenter v. Chrysler
Corp., 853 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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purchasing, but testified that they would not have purchased the car had
they been aware of an incorrect odometer reading, and that knowing that
the reading was incorrect would have raised their suspicions about the
car. 182 From this, the court inferred that the plaintiffs effectively relied
on the false odometer reading in purchasing the vehicle.1 83 Similarly, in
Knop v. McMahan,184 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's inference that a purchaser relied on a representation that the
85
Case
defendant held free and clear title to the goods in question.
1 86
inferences.
similar
of
examples
other
with
replete
are
reporters
However, a decision to infer reliance does not necessarily entail
acceptance of the proposed class wholesale. In Miles v. America Online,
Inc., 87 the court declined to certify the proposed class of all of the
defendant's members and limited the class to "those individuals targeted
by AOL's marketing program for its internet access service, who used
AOL's service and incurred long distance charges188and for whom reliance
may be inferred by the class member's conduct."

182.

Carpenter,853 S.W.2d at 355-56.

183. Id.
184. 872 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1989).
185. Id. at 1142.
186. See City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Group, 918 F.2d 438, 450 (4th Cir.
1990) (inferring reliance on defendants' representations that pipe met certain standards);
Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665, 679 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding, in case in
which defendant compensated plaintiffs in a manner that conflicted with contract terms, it
was "implausible that, in initiating or continuing their employment with MCI, the
salespersons did not rely on the commission plans which they were required to sign");
Wholesale Motors, Inc. v. Williams, 814 So. 2d 227, 230 (Ala. 2001) (inferring reliance
on incorrect odometer reading where plaintiff said that he wanted a car with less mileage
than his then-current vehicle and questioned odometer's accuracy); Mosier v. S. Cal.
Physicians Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (inferring
reliance in part from plaintiff's acceptance of offer); E. Providence Loan Co. v. Ernest,
236 A.2d 639, 642 (R.I. 1968) (inferring that lender relied on borrower's financial
information in making loan); cf In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505, 510 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[A] trial court may infer reliance from the various facts and circumstances of a case.");
Chisolm v. TransSouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538, 563 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("Often reliance
is a matter that is demonstrated inferentially and by circumstantial proof."); Hunter v.
McKenzie, 239 P. 1090, 1094 (Cal. 1925) ("The fact of reliance upon alleged false
representations may be inferred from the circumstances attending the transaction which
oftentimes afford much stronger and more satisfactory evidence of the inducement which
prompted the party defrauded to enter into the contract than his direct testimony to the
same effect."); Kopeikin v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 679 P.2d 599, 602 (Colo.
1984) ("[D]irect evidence of reliance.., is not required."); Poulsen v. Treasure State
Indus., Inc., 626 P.2d 822, 827 (Mont. 198 1) ("An inference of reliance upon fraudulent
representations may be drawn from circumstances surrounding the transaction which
have been proven."); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 418
S.E.2d 648, 661 (N.C. 1992) ("[P]roof of circumstances from which the jury may
reasonably infer the fact is sufficient in proving the element of reliance.").
187. 202 F.R.D. 297 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
188. ld. at 305.
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Our Dizz-Away example is a hypothetical to which the UTPCPL
would apply in this way. There is no reason that any consumer would
purchase Dizz-Away other than to relieve the symptoms of motion
sickness; it does not freshen breath, does not act as a soporific, and does
not increase alertness. Moreover, the representation that Dizz-Away
eases suffering from motion sickness is prominently displayed on the
product's box in such a way that nearly all purchasers will see the
representation. In this scenario, where the representations are false, it
could easily be inferred that a consumer saw the misrepresentation and
that the misrepresentation constituted a material inducement to purchase
the product. This would allow the court to infer reliance on a class-wide
basis, thus avoiding the sticky entanglement of individual questions of
fact and law and allowing certification of the class. 189 Although the
events that would allow such an inference may be unlikely to transpire,
their occurrence could help to resolve a class action plaintiff's difficulties
associated with establishing reliance and common questions of fact and
law.
To the extent that the 1996 Amendment leaves room for an injured
consumer to prove causation only, the burden on a class action plaintiff
is greatly eased. Indeed, one need look no further than Weinberg itself to
find deceptive conduct by a defendant that caused damage to a class as a
whole, even in the absence of reliance. If this route is closed, however,
the options available for consumers will be limited severely, and the
UTPCPL will largely cease to afford classes of injured consumers a way
to receive compensation for the damages they have suffered as a result of
a perpetrator's deceptive conduct.
VI. Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Weinberg has the potential to place Pennsylvania on the
fringes of consumer protection law and to curtail the ability of injured
consumers to seek relief through a class action under the UTPCPL. At
the same time, however, Weinberg fails to resolve several key debates
over class actions and the UTPCPL, and a narrow reading of Weinberg
leaves room for consumer class actions in limited circumstances.
In the future, Pennsylvania courts should secure consumers' rights
by interpreting Weinberg narrowly. If they do not, Pennsylvania
consumers will have no effective means of seeking compensation in all
189. Cf SHELDON & EDELMAN, supra note 48, § 9.3.4.2 n.84 (collecting decisions in
which the fact that a product was either worthless or worth far less than it would have
been if the defendant's representations concerning it were true allowed an inference of
reliance and justified class certification).
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but the most limited circumstances, a result that baldly contravenes the
guarantees that were intended by the drafters of the UTPCPL more than
thirty years ago.

